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CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL
THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION AS
AN ESTABLISHMENT AND AN ACCOMMODATION
OF RELIGION*
By RAYMOND B. MAnciNt
"Conscience is a God to all mortals."
-MENANDER, Greek poet, 5th cent. B.C.
The Draft Act of 1917' must have been hailed as a pro-
gressive bit of legislation. By its terms, the much abused
and discredited "substitute-purchase" system2 of Civil War
days was forbidden. Cowardice and indolence were no
longer able to buy exemption from military service. Re-
ligious dissent, of course, continued to be recognized as a
ground for exemption from combatant senice. The religious
dissenter, however, in order to be eligible for the exemption,
was required to be affiliated with a well-recognized relig-
ious sect or organization whose creed or principles forbade
its members to participate in war in any form. Visions of
industrious Amishmen and resolute Quaker pioneers
seemed, at the time, to punctuate the 1917 conscientious
objector law with a worthy and self-evident fairness.
A claim under the religion clauses 3 of the first amendment
was somewhat of a novelty in 1918. Twenty years would
pass before the religion clauses were construed as falling
* Author's Note: The conscientious objector exemption is available exclu-
sively to religious consciences. Nonreligious conscientious objectors are excluded
from the exemption. This religious favoritism is unfair and, moreover, un-
constitutional. This paper presents a re-interpretation of the religious phrases
in the conscientious objector exemption, which will preserve their constitution-
ality, while removing their unfairness.
t Of the Hartford Bar; Legislative Research Assistant, Legislative Commis-
sioner's Office, Hartford.
1 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
2 Federal Conscription Act of 1863; 12 Stat. 731, 733.
3 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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under the protection of the fourteenth amendment, and so,
in 1918, there was scant development of the law beyond the
usual healthy exchanges over Jeffersonian and Madisonian
concepts of religious freedom. In this context, it is no great
surprise that, when the Draft Act of 19174 received its omni-
bus constitutional test,5 the Supreme Court dismissed any
first amendment religious claim with an almost by-the-way
brevity:
. . . And we pass without anything but statement the
proposition that an establishment of religion or an inter-
ference with the free exercise thereof resulted from the
exemption clauses of the act to which we at the outset
referred, because we think its unsoundness is too appar-
ent to require us to do more. 6
What is surprising, however, is that this succinct holding
remained undefiled for four decades.
7
Those four decades witnessed the dynamic, if not
always consistent, introjection of the first amendment re-
ligious guarantees into such varied areas of governmental
activity as welfare,8 commerce, 9 education, ° public em-
ployment"1 and school prayer.' 2 That the conscientious ob-
jector exemption was able to elude the devastating sweep
4 Supra note 1.
5 Selective Draft Law Cases (Arver v. United States), 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
6 Id. at 389, 390.
7 The most recent example of the still forceful influence of Arver's abbrevi-
ated religious holding is Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 930 (1963). The Etcheverry court, in dismissing
a first amendment religious attack on the conscientious objector exemption,
relied solely on Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13, 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1956),
and George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied
344 U.S. 843 (1952). The Clark court, in its handling of the religious issue,
relied solely on the George decision, and the George court, in turn, relied solely
on the language in Arver, quoted supra, note 6.
8 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9 Sunday Closing Law Cases (McGowan v. Maryland), 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
10 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
11 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
12Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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of the religion clauses for over forty years can only be
explained by resorting to two propositions of law:
First, Congress could, if it so desired, deny the exemption
altogether. 13 No provision of the Constitution, not even the
revered free exercise clause, compels Congress to recognize
or proclaim any "right" to exemption on religious grounds.
The granting of an exemption from military or combatant
service to religious or conscientious objectors is a matter of
"legislative grace.""4 This first proposition is a valid reflec-
tion of the law today
Secondly, what Congress might deny altogether, it might
condition, even unreasonably. 5  This second, somewhat
shaky, proposition, when applied to the conscientious ob-
jector exemption, has been called the "legislative grace
theory."' Its long overdue demise is what finally brought
13 This principle, although it may want questioning, has consistently been
followed ever since the Supreme Court, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 29 (1905), stated that an individual " . . . may be compelled, by force if
need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his
pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his
place in the ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance of being shot
down in its defense." See Selective Draft Law Cases, supra note 5, at 378;
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929); United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623, 624 (1931); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S.
245, 264, 265 (1934); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 572, 573 (1945).
14 See cases cited id.; Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378, 383 (10th Cir.
1959); Clark v. United States, supra note 7, at 23; Uffelman v. United States,
230 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1956); White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782, 785
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 970 (1955); George v. United States,
supra note 7, at 449; Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir.
1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 892 (1950); Cannon v. United States, 181 F.2d
354, 355, 356 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 892 (1950); Gara v.
United States, 178 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1949), a/fd per curiam 340 U.S. 857
(1950); Rase v. United States, 129 F.2d 204, 210 (6th Cir. 1942); Local Draft
Board No. 1 v. Connors, 124 F.2d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1941); United States v.
Crawford, 119 F. Supp. 729, 730 (N.D. Calif. 1954); United States v. Alvies,
112 F. Supp. 618, 619 (N.D. Calif. 1953); United States v. Newman, 44 F.
Supp. 817, 819 (E.D. II. 1942).
15 George v. United States, supra note 7, at 450.
16 The "legislative grace theory" depended for its existence on the proposi-
tion that the granting of conscientious objector exemptions is a matter of
legislative grace, but the two ought not to be confused. The latter reflects the
law today, but the former does not.
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the religious issue back from its forty-year exile. It is diffi-
cult to believe that merely because Congress was granting a
privilege rather than recognizing a right in enacting the
conscientious objector exemption, it was not then bound
by the strictures of reasonableness and constitutionality, and
yet that very argument consistently prevailed.
17
That the Supreme Court, in 1965, finally took its first
serious step 8 in considering the constitutionality of the
conscientious objector exemption is due less to the pressure
of inconsistent lower court decisions, 9 and more to a chain
of events begun in 1958. In that year, the argument that a
legislative body may disregard constitutional guarantees in
enacting a "privilege" was repudiated in Speiser v. Ran-
dal. 20  In Speiser the constitutional guarantee which was
not allowed to be disregarded was that of free speech. But,
in 1963, Sherbert v. Verner21 extended the Speiser holding
to the religious situation:
It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial
of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.
... In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, we emphasized
that conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained
if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit
or deter the exercise of first amendment freedoms. 22
Finally, when a would-be conscientious objector, who ac-
17 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in George v. United States, supra
note 7, at 450, presents a study of the success of this type of argument in cases
dealing with the sale of intoxicating liquors, regulation of commerce and
waiver of immunity.
18 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
19 A 1948 amendment to the conscientious objector exemption added a
definition of "religious training and belief" which seemingly required belief
in a "Supreme Being" as a condition of eligibility. Prior to the amendment,
Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946), had interpreted
"religious training and belief" as requiring "responsibility to an iuthority
higher and beyond any worldly one," whereas United States v. Kauten, 133
F.2d 703, 708 (2nd Cir. 1943), stressed an inner "compelling voice of con-
science" as the religious criterion.
20 357 U.S. 513 (1958).




knowledgedly failed to meet the present law's requirement
of belief in a Supreme Being,2 3 attacked the statute on first
amendment religious grounds, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in United States v. Seeger,2 4 observed that ". . . it
now seems well-established that legislative power to deny a
particular privilege altogether does not imply an equivalent
power to grant such a privilege on unconstitutional
grounds."25
When Seeger's claim reached the Supreme Court, it was
joined with two others26 to become the latest and most com-
prehensive analysis of the conscientious objector exemp-
tion.2 7 The constitutional attack was noted in the court's
opinion:
The parties raise the basic question of the constitutionality
of the section which defines the term "religious training
and belief" . . . The constitutional attack is launched
under the First Amendment's Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses and is twofold: (1) The section does
not exempt non-religious conscientious objectors; and
(2) it discriminates between different forms of religious
expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
2 8
Although the constitutional issue seems to be firmly
before the Court, the assertion, in the opinion, that the
Court "granted certiorari in each of the cases because of
their importance in the administration of the Act,"2 hints
23 The text of the present law is as follows: "Nothing contained in this
title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training
and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." Selective
Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, 612 (1948); 50 U.S.C.A. app. 456(j).
24 326 F.2d 846 (2nd Cir. 1964).
25 Id. at 404, 405.
2 6 United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2nd Cir. 1963); Peter v. United
States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963).





ominously that the decision just might not satiate our con-
stitutional appetites.
Most of our case law regarding the establishment of re-
ligion clause owes its genesis and evolution to the proposi-
tion that once the establishment issue is raised, the law
itself is on trial.3° In order to raise the establishments issue
no aggrievement is necessary.3 The only standing to sue
required is the ability to question. Seeger, unfortunately, is
a departure from that proposition. Constitutionality, in the
Seeger opinion, is tied to aggrievement, and, when the
definition of "religious training and belief" is construed
broadly enough to embrace the views of each of the claim-
ants, thereby avoiding aggrievement, constitutionality is
reposed.
In short, Seeger is a free exercise decision. The question
of whether or not the conscientious objector exemption,
couched, as it is, in religious terms, constitutes an establish-
ment of religion is not answered. But, despite its omission
to consider the establishment question, the Seeger opinion
is of no minor importance.
It prescribes a completely objective standard for deter-
mining one's eligibility for the exemption:
... [D] oes the claimed belief occupy the same place in
the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds
in the life of one clearly qualified for the exemption.
32
The effect of admitting a belief which is not in the ordinary
sense "religious," but which can be shown to stand in loco
religionis, is to deny the possibility of aggrievement. If no
entry can be made into the mind of an applicant in order to
30 "The Establishment Clause . . . is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not." Engel v. Vitale, supra note 12, at 431.
31 "[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under the
Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not
include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed." Abington School
District v. Schempp, supra note 12, at 224. See also McGowan v. Maryland,
supra note 9, at 430, 431; Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961);
Everson v. Board of Education, supra note 8.
32 United States v. Seeger, supra note 18, at 184.
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determine if there is any difference between what he claims
to be religious and what Congress meant by "religious," then
no discrimination, and therefore no aggrievement is possible.
The Court points out that the task of the local draft boards,
in administering the exemption, is
... to decide whether the beliefs professed by a regis-
trant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own
scheme of things, religious.
33
It would seem that under the parallel belief test an
agnostic, or even an atheist, might qualify for the exemption
as long as his reasons "are, in his own scheme of things,
religious." If so, we are faced with the enigma that the
court prescinds from applying its decision to atheists.
No party claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on
this ground. The question is not therefore between
theistic and atheisticbeliefs. We do not deal with or in-
timate any decision on that situation in these cases. 34
Douglas, concurring, also points out that none of the claim-
ants was an avowedly irreligious person or an atheist, and
muses, in a footnote: "If he was an atheist, quite different
problems would be presented. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488." 35
The Torcaso, of Torcaso v. Watkins,36 may or may not
have been an atheist. No mention of Torcaso's personal re-
ligious beliefs or lack of them appears in the Court's
opinion. A reading of the opinion makes us aware only
that he refused to take an oath of belief in God as required
by Maryland law of applicants for public office. Torcaso v.
Watkins 17 stands for the proposition that the requiring of a
religious test for public office constitutes an establishment
of religion.38
33 Id. at 185. (Emphasis supplied.)
34 Id. at 173, 174.
35 Id. at 193.
36 Supra note 11.
37 Ibid.
3 Despite its obvious applicability, the Supreme Court was careful to avoid
a decision on article VI of the United States Constitution, and chose instead
to pitch its decision in Torcaso squarely on the establishment clause. Id. at 491,
496.
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The fact that we are not aware whether or not Torcaso
was an atheist is not simply a minor annoyance. It is a fact
of key urgency to a complete understanding of United
States v. Seeger. 9
Although the Seeger court expressly prescinds from ex-
tending its holding to cover atheists, its parallel belief, or
substitute belief, or belief in loco religionis doctrine would
seem to render the appellation "atheist" quite irrelevant.
The person whom the Seeger court really excludes from the
purview of its decision is, as Douglas hints, a "Torcaso," i.e.,
a person, be he atheist or Anglican, be he Mennonite or
Methodist, who simply objects to the requiring of a religious
test for the securing of a public benefit. The very existence
of a religious test, albeit a test cleansed of aggrievement,
places the prestige of government behind religion and
places irreligion as well as nonreligion at a governmentally
created disadvantage. The issue left undecided by the
Seeger court has substance.
There is one caveat for those who would raise the estab-
lishment of religion issue in order to "liberalize" the con-
scientious objector exemption. An establishment of religion
claim must presuppose the severability of the words "re-
ligious training and belief" and their definition from the
exemption itself. A severability provision was added to the
exemption in 1951.40
Does the religious test 41 in the conscientious objector ex-
emption establish a religion contrary to the provisions of the
first amendment? The Supreme Court, with admirable forti-
tude, has provided us with a test for determining what types
of enactments violate the establishment clause:
The test may be stated as follows: What are the purpose
39 Supra note 18.
40 Universal Military Training and Service Act, sec. 5; 65 Stat. 75, 88
(1951).
41 The Seeger court assumed, and we are at this point assuming that the
words "by reason of religious training and belief" and their definition (supra
note 23) are a test, i.e., an eligibility requirement. We shall have reason to
question this assumption infra, and shall consider an alternative.
19661
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and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed
by the constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.
42
Although the legislative purpose in enacting the conscien-
tious objector exemption can quite validly be held to be
secular, 43 it is difficult to argue that the primary effect of a
provision which confines the dispensing of .a public benefit
or privilege to religious individuals does not advance re-
ligion. And, we are told, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 44 that the
federal government can not "constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-
believers. '45 It is difficult to argue that the Supreme Court,
which, in Torcaso v. Watkins, held a state religious test for
public office to be an establishment of religion, ought not
to render an identical holding regarding a federal religious
test for a public benefit.
However, those who would save the religious test in the
conscientious objector exemption are not without authority.
Brennan, concurring in Abington School District v.
Schempp,46 states that
nothing in the Establishment Clause forbids the
application of legislation having purely secular ends in
such a way as to alleviate burdens upon the free exercise
of an individual's religious beliefs .. .Such a principle
might support, for example, the constitutionality of draft
exemptions for ministers and divinity students .. 4
And again, with reference to the majority opinion's require-
42 Abington School District v. Schempp, supra note 12, at 222.
43 "All our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience
has a moral and social value which makes its worthy of preservation at the
hands of the state." Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COL. UNIV. Q. 253,
269 (1919). Quoted in United States v. Seeger, supra note 18, at 170.
4 4 Supra note 11.
4
5 Id. at 495.
4 6 Supra note 12.
47 Id. at 295, 298.
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ment of neutrality in religious matters, Brennan goes on to
state: "On the other hand, hostility, not neutrality, would
characterize .. . the withholding of draft exemptions for
ministers and conscientious objectors ...48 There is a small
but oft-quoted body of law on the proposition that the re-
ligious needs of the people may be accommodated where
no stronger state interest intervenes. The New York State
released time for religious education program was upheld in
Zorach v. Clauson49 under that proposition.
We follow the McCollum ° case. But we cannot expand
it to cover the present released time program unless sep-
aration of Church and State means that public institutions
can make no adjustments of their schedules to accom-
modate the religious needs of the people.51
The New York law upheld in Zorach was, and is, religious
in subject matter and legislative purpose. Evidently a
"legislative purpose" and a "primary effect" which accom-
modate religion without advancing it pass the Supreme
Court's test as set down in Abington School District v.
Schempp.52 This is true because of the fact that the Schempp
court expressly considered the Zorach holding and left it
intact, contenting itself with distinguishing Zorach on its
facts.
The accommodation of religion doctrine, raised to the
status of a Supreme Court holding in the Zorach case, is
the strongest and soundest justification for the religious
phrases in the conscientious objector exemption. The Seeger
decision presages this justification by its broad, almost all-
inclusive construction of what Congress meant in using the
term "religious." The point is this: If conscientious objec-
tion is held to be a "religious need" of conscientious ob-
jectors, then the religious phrases in the exemption lose
their defining and restricting sense entirely. What Congress
48 Id. at 299.
49 Supra note 10.
50 McCollum v. Board of Education, ibid.
51 Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 10, at 315.
52 Supra note 12.
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has done is to identify conscientious objection as a "religious
need" and to provide, permissibly, for its accommodation.
The "religious training and belief" phrase in the exemption
ceases to be a religious test and becomes instead an affirma-
tion that Congress considered conscientious opposition to
war to be religious in nature. The identification of all con-
scientious opposition to war as being religious would com-
plement the Seeger, highly generalized construction of re-
ligion, and relieve its somewhat artificial strain.
The accommodation of religion rationale requires, of
course, a complete re-reading of the words of the exemption
and a complete re-analysis of Congress's intent in enacting
it. The words "by reason of religious training and belief"
in the exemption serve, not to exclude a class of individuals
whose opposition is other than by reason of religious train-
ing and belief, but to identify conscientious objection, what-
ever manifestation it may assume in the mental apparatus
of the objector, as a religious phenomenon. In other words,
in enacting the exemption, Congress was seeking to accom-
modate that religious phenomenon known as conscientious
objection, and not religious conscientious objection. Under
this rationale conscientious objection is, by legislative identi-
fication, a religious phenomenon even though it may mani-
fest itself as part of an atheistic or irreligious system of
belief. Admittedly, we are hard put to justify the statutory
definition of religious training and belief,53 under the ac-
commodation rationale. We must assume that the definition
was Congress's attempt to describe, for purposes of clarifica-
tion, the religious phenomenon whereby opposition to par-
ticipation in war in any form becomes conscientious. The
exclusion of "essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views '' 54 is an exclusion of those things which are
not truly matters of conscience. In the exclusion of "a
merely personal moral code"55 from the description of the





religious phenomenon of conscientious objection, we do
encotmter some strain. A merely personal moral code must
be construed as an entirely personal set of rules of conduct,
e.g., good manners, which involves no concept of duty.
Once the higher duty of conscience enters the personal moral
code, it is no longer "merely" personal. It becomes what
Congress has identified as a religious phenomenon.
Zorach, though by far the strongest, is not the only au-
thority for the accommodation of religion doctrine. Harlan's
dissent in Sherbert v. Verner 6 challenged the majority on
its holding that the free exercise clause required North
Carolina to grant unemployment compensation benefits to
a sabbatarian even though the sabbatarian was unavailable
for Saturday work. However, in an example of the exemp-
tion technique, Harlan wandered into a clear recognition of
the accommodation of religion doctrine:
My own view, however, is that at least under the circum-
stances of this case it would be a permissible accommoda-
tion of religion for the State, if it chose to do so, to create
an exception to its eligibility requirements for persons
like the appellant. 57
It will be obvious that, in saving the religious phrases of
the conscientious objector exemption under the accommo-
dation of religion doctrine, we are also taking away from
them all substantive meaning. To save the religious phrases
under the accommodation rationale, to hold that the re-
ligious phrases are in fact unconstitutional or to rewrite the
exemption deleting any reference to religion - all are one
and the same in effect. The accommodation rationale has,
on its side, only the virtue of palatability.
Nor is the accommodation of religion doctrine the only
justification for the religious phrases in the exemption. Fel-
lowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,58 a California
case which may have provided the Seeger court with the
5 6 Supra note 21.
571 d. at 422. (Italics in original.)
,'s 153 Cal.App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
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basis for its decision, 9 dealt with the constitutionality of
property tax exemptions for religious organizations. After
stating its rule of objectivity and nondiscrimination in the
administering of tax exemptions, the California court went
on to consider whether or not the very existence of such a
tax exemption is an establishment of religion.
Direct tax subsidies of any church or sect or of all churches
and sects are undoubtedly prohibited by the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution . .. A tax exemp-
tion is, obviously, an indirect subsidy. . .60
The theory is that in an area where the state has an interest
it may legislate, and the legislation will not be held to be an
establishment of religion merely because it incidentally 6' or
indirectly benefits religion.
The area of conscientious objection is an area in which
the state authority has a legitimate interest. The desirability
of a clear conscienced citizenry within a nation which prizes
freedom and individuality is well understood. Seeger rec-
ognizes it.12  If the means which Congress employed to
foster and encourage a clear conscienced citizenry were
nonreligious, 3 then the incidental benefit theory of Everson
and the California tax case might apply. But Congress has
59 The Fellowship of Humanity case held firmly and unequivocally for the
proposition that no governmental inquiry into the content or validity of any
religious belief can ever be permitted. The only permissible inqury is the
purely objective one of whether or not the claimed belief occupies the same
place in the lives of its holders as is occupied by more orthodox beliefs in the
lives of believing majorities. See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
86 (1944).
60 Supra note 58, at 406, 407.
61 Everson v. Board of Education, supra note 8, held that providing bus
service to parochial as well as public school children was justified as a "wel-
fare" measure, even though religion was incidentally benefited thereby. And,
in McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 9, the Supreme Court advises us that
. .. the 'Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with
the tenets of some or all religions." Supra note 9, at 442.
62 See note 43.
63 If the exemption from combatant service were based only on sincere
conscientious training and belief, religious consciences, of course, would benefit,
but any benefit would be so incidental as to be accidental.
[Vol. 40
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used the words "religious training and belief" as a require-
ment and therefore has drawn a religious periphery enclos-
ing favored religious consciences, not incidentally, but by
design.
64
It is better to face the evident fact that Congress, when
it enacted the conscientious objector exemption, was legis-
lating directly and expressly on the subject of religion. It is
better to assume that Congress sought, not the advance-
ment of religion, rather its accommodation.
The Supreme Court has deftly and wisely eliminated
aggrievement by its parallel belief holding in Seeger. It has
removed the advantage and preference of religion from the
administration of the exemption. Fairness requires the re-
moval of the religious preference and advantage inherent in
the religious phrases of the exemption themselves. Only
then may the conscientious objector exemption be justly
hailed as a progressive bit of legislation.
64 See note 41. Even if we assume that the words "religious training and
belief" are not an eligibility requirement (if we assume that they are Congress's
way of identifying all conscientious objection as a religious phenomenon), it is
clear that Congress was acting, not incidentally, but by design.
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